Afghanistan Peace Journal (APJ) is an interdisciplinary open access quarterly journal with a main focus on Afghanistan’s peace process. APJ was initiated by Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO) to serve as a platform for information exchange, discussion and civic debate.
APJ organizes and hosts events such as roundtable discussions and inter-community consultations at the community, provincial and national levels as a means to elevate locally based notions of wellbeing to levels where they are debated in the wider public sphere to create opportunities for learning and developing shared understanding and to serve as steps toward a broad-based agreement on what constitutes the greater good at the national level. The data from the roundtables and other events are analyzed for articles to be published in APJ as a means to mainstream constructive dialogue on peace.
The overarching goal for APJ is to strike a balance between normative conceptualizations and actual empirical evidence of issues relating to peacebuilding. As such, the journal particularly welcomes submissions that are informed by different conceptualizations of sustainable peace, its processes and related issues, illustrated or tested in empirical settings.
The target audiences for APJ are Afghan and international non-government organizations, Afghan government, opposition groups including but not limited to the Taliban, international development and humanitarian aid agencies, and regional government and non-government entities with political and economic stakes in Afghanistan.
APJ is peer reviewed through a partnership with Ruhr University Bochum, Germany.
For submission of articles, see Instruction for Authors, below, for full details.
Sustainability of a peace agreement in any context is to a large extent a function of an inclusive peace process and a widely shared notion of the greater good replacing the status quo. Efforts to strengthen Afghanistan’s peace process, therefore, need to address:
- Development of a clear working definition of sustainable peace as a state of being, or set of conditions, where conflict among different factions at all levels can be resolved without resorting to violence, political exclusion, and oppression while there are grounds for mutual understanding, increasing trust, cooperation, and collaboration to resolve conflicts that could undermine peace.
- Conceptualization of the greater good and sustainable peace based on dialogue among multiple and diverse actors and supported by empirical evidence and analysis.[i]
- Education on peace, used broadly to include learning by doing, learning by interaction – particularly through sharing experiences – as well as learning through formal instruction in early and later education.
- Roles of external (regional and international) actors in the peace process and the degrees to which these actors can support or undermine peace efforts.
- Monitoring system to track changes, both positive and negative, in the peace process based on clear indicators, periodic reporting, and using indices such as the Global Peace Index.
- Public outreach process to facilitate moving from concepts and evidence to policy and practice.[ii]
Considering the above parameters, the current intra-Afghan peace process is incomplete and stands opposite to inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability. In addition, civil society is absent from the political process, there is no strategic direction by Afghanistan’s international allies to guide the peace process, and there is no agenda reflecting the greater good for Afghanistan – apart from periodic statements by national and international actors about the need to protect women’s and human rights.
Without addressing these shortcomings, any negotiated peace agreement between the government and the Taliban runs the risk of disserving large segments of the peace constituency in Afghanistan while failing to address regional and international security concerns.
Primarily, Afghanistan Peace Journal (APJ) will contribute to meeting conditions 1 and 2, above. Meeting conditions 3-6 will be a function of externally supported activities implemented by APPRO and its partners aimed at articulating visions of the greater good for Afghanistan insofar as these visions are evidence-based and consistent with the wellbeing of individuals as inseparable members of their communities and consistent with the good of the community as a whole. As such, visions of the greater good that will emerge from the civic discourse facilitated by APPRO and APJ will have implications for good governance, particularly in terms of inclusiveness, transparency and accountability.
Civic discourse on peace facilitated by APJ with support from APPRO and National Advocacy Committee for Public Policy (NAC-PP) will aim at creating spaces for attempts to address political, social, cultural and economic issues faced by diverse communities at different levels throughout Afghanistan.[iii] The discourse will serve as the vehicle for the development of mutual understanding, tolerance, and coming to sustainable compromises as the foundational elements for social and political peace.
APJ, APPRO and NAC-PP will organize and host events such as roundtable discussions and inter-community consultations at the community, provincial and national levels as means to elevate locally based notions of wellbeing to levels where they can be debated in the wider public sphere to create opportunities for learning and developing shared understanding, and to serve as steps toward a broad-based agreement on what constitutes the greater good at the national level. The data from the roundtables and other events will be systematically analyzed for articles to be published in APJ as a means to mainstream constructive dialogue on peace.
The journal’s scope includes all topics of relevance to conflict management and attaining sustainable peace at multiple levels. In addition to articles based on national and sub-national events organized and hosted by APJ, the journal will welcome relevant submissions based on analyses of empirical data from around the world with implications for Afghanistan. The main language of this journal is English but articles in Dari and Pashto are also welcomed.
APJ serves as a reservoir of empirical analyses and source of information on drivers of conflict and pathways to sustainable peace. The articles in APJ, and various communiqués based on APJ contents, are intended to inform multiple stakeholders at all levels whose decisions and actions have implications for peace and conflict in Afghanistan.
Issues of Interest
All articles in APJ address one or more of the issues described below. Papers addressing issues not listed below may be considered from time to time and based on the discretion of the Editorial Board.
With a focus on sustainable peace in Afghanistan and based on experiences of peace processes from around the world, the following key areas of interest have been identified by the journal’s editors. All submissions are expected to be based on empirical analysis of data from secondary and/or primary sources.
Attaining sustainable peace requires that a post-peace government functions based on “popular sovereignty”, or a form of government based on consent of citizens. The main characteristics of popular sovereignty are:
- The people are involved either directly or through their representatives in the making of a constitution.
- The constitution made in the name of the people is ratified by a majority vote of the people or by representatives elected by the people.
- The people are involved directly or indirectly in proposing and ratifying amendments to their constitution.
- The people indicate support for their government when they vote in public elections, uphold the constitution and basic principles of their government, and work to influence public policy decisions and otherwise prompt their representatives in government to be accountable to them.[iv]
Applying popular sovereignty to Afghanistan’s peace process would entail having a framework characterized by transparency and accountability; inclusiveness to ensure that the needs of all segments of society, particularly the most vulnerable, are openly addressed; representativeness in terms of who negotiates; and mechanisms for oversight by third parties to ensure sustainability after the peace agreement.
Applying popular sovereignty to the peace process in Afghanistan would also necessitate input and active participation from civil society, broadly defined to include Afghan NGOs, private sector, formal and traditional religious authorities, and various forms of community-based organizations.
Submissions are expected to contextualize the notion of popular sovereignty for Afghanistan, specifying the key actors, factors and mechanisms that would support or undermine efforts to institute popular sovereignty in Afghanistan.
Political Process of Peace Building
Achieving sustainable peace requires an endogenous process, supported by external actors, with strong
and inclusive national ownership and leadership and a multi-sectoral, all-encompassing metapolicy or vision subscribed to at the highest levels. In the current peace talks with the Taliban there is little or no endogenous process, strong and inclusive national ownership and leadership are lacking, and multi-sectoral, all-encompassing metapolicy is missing.
The teams negotiating with the Taliban in the intra-Afghan talks have been largely made up of representatives of the elite powerholders whose main priority is to account to their own exclusive constituency. Compromises with the Taliban by a group that does not fully represent all Afghans and thus lacks legitimacy on the rights of women, youth, and minorities are likely to counter international human rights conventions to which Afghanistan is signatory and the various rights-related provisions within Afghanistan’s Constitution.
To date, there has been no coherent, collective, inclusive or adequately resourced effort to organize civil society at multiple levels and from varying population segments to participate with voice in Afghanistan’s peace process. Without addressing the fundamental deficiencies of the peace process, any negotiated peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban runs the risk of disserving large segments of the peace constituency in Afghanistan.
In more complete peace processes, there is clear evidence of multiple tracks for diplomacy on peace:
Track 1 diplomacy consists of high-level diplomatic engagement led by highly visible mediators mutually recognized by the conflict parties. It is aimed at influencing the structures of political power to identify peaceful resolutions of conflict and define negotiation outcomes.[v]
Track 2 diplomacy refers to unofficial, informal interactions between constituencies of conflict parties. Their objective is to “develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.”[vi] Track 2 is intended to provide a bridge between leaders that participate in Track 1 and people’s expectations about peace. They typically include middle-range actors who are not necessarily formally connected to conflict parties.
Track 3 diplomacy refers to engagement at the grassroots level, between citizens involved in local communities who experience the day-to-day effects of conflict, including struggles in access to food water, income, shelter, protection and safety.[vii]
The peace negotiations with the Taliban to date, though insufficiently inclusive and unrepresentative, approximate to a Track 1 in Afghanistan’s peace process. A Track 2 for the intra-Afghan peace talks should consist of civil society organizations including citizens’ groups from government-controlled and Taliban-controlled areas, rights-based NGOs, businesses, labor associations, think tanks, academics, religious institutions and actors, and local government officials and anti-government authorities participating in personal capacity. Track 3 should consist of representatives from the grassroots level and include community-based organizations, local NGOs carrying out humanitarian aid projects, local health officials, and representatives from the internally displaced and returnees.[viii]
Civil society, broadly defined, can and must play instrumental roles in driving efforts to open up and supplement Track 1 of Afghanistan’s peace process by formally establishing Track 2 and Track 3 for the intra-Afghan peace negotiations. Once established, Track 2 and Track 3 would need to be maintained by civil society as the de facto framework or mechanism for peace negotiations. These two tracks would create spaces and opportunities for debate and dialogue on the common good for Afghanistan and the likelihood, or lack thereof, for the emergence of a unifying agenda to attain it.
Submissions are expected to provide insight into what could be done, in practical terms, to bolster Track 1 and institute Track 2 and/or Track 3, as the necessary elements of an inclusive framework for peace and the means through which to work toward a sustainable peace agreement.
Agenda for Peace
There has been, so far, no clearly outlined agenda for peace in Afghanistan. The ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’ signed on February 29, 2020 between the United States and the Taliban is limited to an honorable withdrawal by the United States from Afghanistan and meeting the Taliban’s main demand for all international military forces to leave Afghan soil. Conditions for a sustainable peace, including state building efforts, protection of human rights, rights of minorities and women’s rights are not addressed in the agreement, and have remained largely absent from the ongoing intra-Afghan talks in Doha. The absence of a comprehensive agenda offering a clear common vision of what a peace agreement would and should entail makes any agreement between the two parties particularly vulnerable, given the fact that even full and comprehensive peace agreements around the world have remained vulnerable to long standing and historically rooted divisions.
In contrast, the Colombian peace process (2012-2016) was guided by an agenda that included commitments by both sides to a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, reductions in poverty and corruption, enhancements in economic development, combating the drugs production and smuggling problems, instituting transitional and restorative justice, ratifying the peace agreement by impartial third parties, and monitoring the implementation of the provisions in the peace agreement.
Submissions should have direct implications for how the common good may be defined for Afghanistan and how the common good may be used to guide efforts to develop agenda(s) for sustainable peace and monitor their implementation after an agreement is reached.
The decades-old conflict in Afghanistan is driven by regional and geopolitical, ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic factors. Compounding these divisions are widespread poverty, rural-urban divide, local conflicts over livelihood resources such as land and water, weak governance, institutionalized corruption, abuse of power, and varying forms of misogyny affecting women as one half of the population.
Without clear and concrete support for peace from neighbors and allies, even if the Taliban stop fighting, other groups or dissenting members of the Taliban are likely to emerge and undermine security and stability in Afghanistan.
The experience from Colombia since the completion of its peace process (2012-2016) clearly demonstrates that a peace agreement is no guarantee of ending a conflict if the agreement has not addressed the root causes of conflict.
Submissions should make direct reference to one or more of the systemic drivers of conflict listed above, and innovative ways in which they could be addressed as parts of integrated and pragmatic approaches to peace making and peace building processes.
The conflict in Afghanistan remains one of the longest-running and deadliest on earth, reaching unprecedented levels in 2020 and concurrent with peace negotiations. Afghan civilians and civilian infrastructure are under constant threat and attacks, forcing countless families to flee the country if they have the means or move to areas with relatively lower levels of conflict and better access to basic services and employment.
Currently, there is no coherent strategic vision to address the acute needs of the internally displace, returnees, and the host communities.
Submissions are expected to provide in-depth analysis of the drivers of displacement and offer practical and realistic pathways for managing displacement despite the ongoing conflict.
Little is known about causal relationships between conflict trauma and protracted conflict and how these relationships might undermine efforts for sustainable peace. These relationships disallow mutual trust and co-existence of the warring sides and their constituents during peace negotiations and after peace. Three key elements need to be considered in relation to conflict trauma.
First, conflict related trauma affects men and women differently. Second, there is insufficient psychological or mental health support available for people suffering from conflict related violence, further exacerbating the issues of unresolved trauma in the short as well as the long term. Third, deeply rooted animosities can take generations to heal, requiring much investment in confidence building and increasing mutual trust.
Offering to compromise on basic rights, driven by helplessness and desperation to have relative peace, should be understood, recognized and addressed through full clarity on different scenarios of peace within a spectrum of imposed (weak) and unsustainable peace and inclusive (strong) and sustainable peace.
Submissions are expected to provide insights and analysis on how trauma-related issues affect attaining peace and what practical measures could be taken as part of a framework for peace to address them.
Representativeness and legitimacy of those who negotiate are crucial to the sustainability of a peace agreement. Given Afghanistan’s less than positive experience of holding free, fair and formal elections, and the heightened state of the conflict, efforts need to be made on how to utilize pre-existing traditional structures to elect representatives rooted in local communities and thus increase their legitimacy within local communities. These structures include village councils, community development councils, district level jirgas, and provincial councils.
If representativeness and legitimacy are addressed, the next challenge is to ensure adequate capacity of these representatives to negotiate on behalf of their constituents. While women and other threatened segments of society such as ethnic and religious minorities should be part of the negotiations, there are clear limitations to their added value if they cannot negotiate with the Taliban whose delegations to date have been exclusively made up of men.
Submissions are expected to demonstrate whether and how Afghanistan’s traditional and formal structures of governance could be used to increase representativeness, legitimacy and capacity of negotiators in peace processes.
In addition to having clear provisions to combat poverty, corruption, illicit drugs production and trafficking, and commitments to increase political participation and improve social and economic conditions, a full and inclusive peace agreement and its related processes need to have provisions for human rights and “Humane and Non-discriminatory Treatment” of persons based on Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.[ix]
A full and inclusive peace agreement also needs to have clear provisions for transitional and restorative justice based on the right to legal identity, effective civilian representation and oversight in all key sectors based on international human rights standards, and protection of civil society, journalists, and human rights defenders.
Submissions are expected to illustrate how a peace process in Afghanistan could fulfill the requirements of meeting international conventions and protocols on human rights. Submissions can also provide insights into how transitional and restorative justice may be implemented in Afghanistan in the event of a peace agreement.
While addressing human rights in general has direct implications for women’s rights, as one half of society and in the Afghan context where women’s equal rights has been the center of all contentions in the past few decades, particular attention needs to be paid to women’s rights in the broader context of addressing human rights.
Also, there is mainstream recognition that men and women experience conflict and its traumas in different ways. The inclusion and participation of women as survivors of the armed conflict and as mediators and/or negotiators in the peace process would be in line with Afghanistan’s commitment to UNSCR 1325, the subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and whole host of international conventions and protocols on women’s rights and human rights.
Submissions are expected to demonstrate, in practical terms, whether and how Afghan women could play key roles in efforts toward sustainable peace.
A key challenge in ensuring the sustainability of a peace agreement is the degree to which the post-peace agreement state acts according to the principles of good governance, particularly the degree to which the new state works with, or against, civil society and its organizations. There is much uncertainty about the prospects for CSOs, including national and local NGOs, under a government heavily influenced or fully run by the Taliban.
The Taliban’s recent statements about women’s rights and human rights in general, have so far not been able to convince Afghan civil society that the underlying principles of these statements are substantially different from those on which the Taliban regime (1996-2001) based itself.
The overwhelming majority of NGOs in Afghanistan has operated through funding provided by international donors since 2001. Nothing is known about how the Taliban view NGOs with mandates driven by adherence to international human rights, inclusion, and equity.
Submissions are expected to provide insights on how civil society should position itself in relation to the Taliban prior to, during, and after a negotiated peace.
Inclusion of Spoilers
A major source of risk to a peace process and peace agreement is the role of spoilers, or powerholders and groups of people who believe that the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve peace.[x]
International custodians of peace, e.g., the United Nations, the European Union, the United States, and some Nordic countries and others, have used different strategies to deal with spoilers, ranging from relying heavily on conciliation to the use of coercion. The choice of an appropriate strategy requires a diagnosis of the types of spoiler in a peace process and consideration of constraints posed by other parties in the peace process.
To have a full and unbiased diagnosis of the types of spoiler requires an open mind and no limitations on what should be deemed as acceptable or reasonable based on some preconceived principles or notions. This diagnosis should then be used by the custodians to “create an external coalition for peace, the resources that the coalition brings to its responsibility, and the consensus that the coalition forms about the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of spoiler demands and behavior.”[xi]
Submissions are expected to explore non-military ways in which spoilers to the peace process may be neutralized or ultimately become stakeholders to peace in Afghanistan.
Despite contributions since 2001 by multiple international donors to improve livelihoods in Afghanistan, there remain alarming rates of poverty and food insecurity. Afghanistan continues to suffer from poor infrastructure and weak governance mechanisms while remaining particularly vulnerable to acute climate change related shocks. Combined, these factors exacerbate resource scarcity, disputes and conflicts over land and water, and forced displacement.
Undernourishment and food insecurity directly affect children, increasing the risks of malnutrition, neglect, exploitation, violence and abuse, child labor, and early marriages for girls.
Economic vulnerabilities increase the risk of turning to alternative sources of personal security and livelihood – including through illicit and destructive activities that sustain the conflict economy.
Lack of prospects for stable livelihoods through productive economic activity will also adversely affect the reintegration of fighters. Reintegration into civilian life will be all the more challenging if the continuation of conflict brings more pecuniary and social benefits than a civilian economy with few or limited prospects for stable income.
Submissions should provide insights into how Afghanistan can better utilize its domestic and international resources to reduce poverty and food insecurity as integrated parts of a peace agenda.
Fighting corruption in other contexts clearly shows that corruption cannot and must not be viewed as merely a technical problem that can be fixed by capacity building, equipment support, or legislation. Fighting corruption has to be a multi-prong, multi-actor intervention, adequately resourced, and long term oriented.
Fighting corruption needs ongoing dialogue, re-education aimed at cultural change, civil society push and participation, committed and responsive state authorities and, in the case of Afghanistan, committed international donors in action as well as words.
Corruption in Afghanistan is endemic and sustained through kleptocratic networks whose interests are best served by the ongoing conflict, a traumatized population, weak governance, and absence of the rule of law.
Submissions are expected to provide insights on what can be done, particularly by civil society, in combating corruption as an integrated part of a peace agenda.
Narcotics, Insurgency and Peace Building
Peacebuilding in all contexts is aimed at providing human security, building democratic state institutions, and increasing licit and productive economic activity by state authorities and citizens alike. In a context marred by ongoing conflict, a well-established opiate industry, weak government, endemic corruption, lack of rule of law and heightened criminal activity, peacebuilding efforts need to go beyond signing high-level, bilateral agreements.
Evidence suggests that the “war on drugs” approach, focusing almost exclusively on eradication and replacement of agriculture for drugs with the much less lucrative “alternative livelihoods,” fails in conflict environments such as Afghanistan due to systemic disorder and a resultant policy incoherence that amounts to “offering different sanctions and incentives to the same people in their different roles as insurgents, politicians, officials, voters, farmers, and drug traffickers.”[xii]
Submissions are expected to shed light on how the narcotics-insurgency nexus bears on the peace process and whether adopting a whole system approach to counter-narcotics policy making in Afghanistan could contribute to the effectiveness of the peace process.
Regional and Global Politics
The more successful peace processes have all benefited from the direct contributions of international actors such as the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations in strategic guidance, technical assistance, and financial support. The peace process in Afghanistan has thus far benefited from financial resources and technical assistance. Lacking has been strategic guidance directed at the sides of the conflict and civil society.
A strategic approach to peacebuilding is typically driven by some clarity and prior agreement on the greater good and an agenda or agendas for peace.
Submissions are expected to provide insights, based on empirical case examples, on how the international actors could provide strategic guidance for Afghanistan’s peace process.
Media and Peace Building
Traditional media (newspapers, TV, radio) can positively and negatively influence attitudes of different population segments toward one another and, thus, improve or undermine social cohesion.
Fact-based, independent, transparent, accountable and impartial reporting by the media can contribute to good governance in peace negotiations through holding officials and civil society accountable for their roles and actions. Media can also place complex and complicated issues such as corruption, violence against women, injustice and marginalization on the agenda for peace.[xiii]
Submissions are expected to examine the manner in which traditional media:
- Has affected the peace process to date
- May serve as a reliable (unbiased, inclusive) source of information about the peace process
- Can build confidence among different groups by, for example, creating spaces for free and open dialogue
Instructions for Authors
Afghanistan Peace Journal welcomes articles on one or more of the above issues with the purpose of contributing to and enriching the discourse on sustainable peace in Afghanistan.
Types of Articles
The journal welcomes submission of full-length research articles, short communications and review articles. The journal also welcomes letters to the editor and commentaries on relevant issues.
Regular articles: Should describe new and carefully articulated findings based on analyses of empirical evidence using verifiable research methodology. The length of a full paper should be a minimum of 4,500 words and a maximum of 8,000 words.
Short Submissions for Debate / Discussion: should contain new and carefully articulated findings based on analyses of empirical evidence from research with a limited scope but offering new perspectives and innovative methods for examining peace-related issues. The length of a short submission should be a minimum of 2,000 words and a maximum of 4,000 words.
Reviews: Submissions may be based on review of books and a related group of articles on an issue of relevance to APJ. The length of a review should be a minimum of 1,000 words and a maximum of 2,000 words.
Letters to Editor: Letters may be commentaries or critics of previous articles published by APJ or articles in other media on issues of interest to APJ. The length of a letter to the editor should be no longer than 1,000 words.
Title: Shorter titles are preferred. Listed immediately after the title should be full names of the authors, affiliations, and contact details (emails and phone numbers).
Abstract: The abstract should be a maximum of 300 words.
Abbreviations: All abbreviations used in the article should be listed. The first appearance of an abbreviation should be in brackets following the fully spelt out term to which the abbreviation refers. All subsequent abbreviations should be used without the brackets through the remainder of the manuscript.
Introduction: The introduction should provide a concise contextual background of the issue to be addressed in the manuscript, ending with a clear problem statement. The problem statement must be one sentence and not exceed two lines.
Objective(s) and Methodology: The manuscript must clearly state the objective(s) of the research on which the manuscript is based, followed by a clear description of the methods used to collect and analyze the data and the limitations that may have a direct bearing on the findings.
Analysis: Findings should be presented consistently and in the same order as the objectives, using a referencing system fully described in an appendix.
Conclusion and Ways Forward: Should answer the problem highlighted or the research question, listing the key findings from the Analysis section and explore their implications for development and humanitarian policy making, further research, and ways forward.
Tables and figures: Tables, boxes and figures should be presented in clear standardized and formats, consistent throughout the manuscript.
Referencing: References should be embedded in the text, in brackets with the surname of the author(s), space, year of publication. All references embedded in the text should appear in alphabetical order at the end of the paper.
[i] Coleman, P. and M. Deutsch (Eds.) (2012). Psychological Components of Sustainable Peace (Springer).
[ii] See, for example: Coleman, P. (2012). The Missing Piece in Sustainable Peace. Available from: https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2012/11/06/the-missing-piece-in-sustainable-peace/
[iii] For more information on National Advocacy Committee for Public Policy, see: www.nac-pp.net
[iv] Patrick, J.J. (2006), Understanding Democracy: A Hip Pocket Guide, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc.)
[v] Mapendere, J (2010), Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks, Culture of Peace Online Journal, 2(1), 66-81.
[vi] Montville, J. (1991). Track Two Diplomacy: The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy. In Volkan, V.D., J. Montville and D.A. Julius (Eds.), The Psychodynamics of International Relations: Vol. 2. Unofficial diplomacy at work (pp. 161-175). Massachusetts: Lexington Books. Cited in Mapendere, J. (2010). op.cit.
[vii] For a description of Track 1, Track 2, and Track 3 in peace negotiations, see: Lederach, J.P. (1997), Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press). For a summary, see: Maiese, M (2003), Levels of Action (Lederach’s Pyramid), available from: https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/hierarchical_intervention_levels
[viii] Some also make reference to “Track 1.5” consultations which consists of “a mix of government officials – who participate in an unofficial capacity – and non-governmental experts, all sitting around the same table.” See, for example, Mapendere, J (2010), Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks, Culture of Peace Online Journal, 2(1), 66-81
[ix] For the full text of the Convention, see: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.32_GC-III-EN.pdf
[x] Stedman, S.J. (1996). “Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflicts”, in Brown, M.E. (ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), pp. 369-371
[xi] Based on Stedman, S.J. (2000), “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, in National Research Council (eds.), International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press)
[xii] Rubin, B.R. and A. Guáqueta (2007). Fighting Drugs and Building Peace: Towards Policy Coherence between Counter-Narcotics and Peace Building (New York: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung), available from: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/usa/04992.pdf
[xiii] UNDP (2018), How media can be an instrument of peace in conflict-prone settings, available from: file:///Users/saeed1/Downloads/UNDPOGC_Media_conflict%20roundtable%20background%20paper.pdf